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Do bosses have a positive effect on worker output and if so, how large and how variable 
is it?   Bosses generally earn more than the workers whom they supervise. Is the productivity that 
they generate worth the additional pay?  It is clear from other studies of productivity that workers 
vary in their output even within the same job category and pay grade. Does boss productivity 
also vary; if so, how significant is the variation both in absolute terms and relative to the workers 
whom they supervise? Even if bosses vary in their effects on worker output, do these variations 
persist or do they die out with time? Finally, are some bosses more likely to retain their workers 
than other bosses?   
These questions merit examination.   A significant fraction of resources is devoted to 
supervision.  Among manufacturing workers, front-line supervisors comprised 10 percent of the 
non-managerial workforce in 2010.  Among retail trade workers, front-line supervisor comprised 
12 percent of the non-managerial workforce.
1
  Despite the potentially important role that
supervisors play, the economics literature has been largely silent on the effects that bosses 
actually have on affecting worker productivity.
2
Even more to the point, the literature has not been able to speak to the importance of the 
various mechanisms through which boss effects might operate.  Most of this is a data issue, but 
some of it reflects the fact that the literature has modeled the relationship between boss and 
worker at an abstract level and has not pushed beyond to examine what is likely to be the most 
important relationship in the workplace.
3
1
 The data is from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics for 2010.  First-line supervisors 
are an occupational class.  For manufacturing, the non-managerial workforce is all those who are not supervisors or 
managers.  For retail, the non-managerial workforce is retail clerks and cashiers. 
2The literature has focused on CEOs or managers in detailed occupations.  For work on CEOs’ productivity, see 
Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, Wolfenzon (2007), Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, Wolfenzon(2007), Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003), Jenter and Lewellen (2010), Kaplan, et.al. (2008), Perez-Gonzalez (2006), Perez-Gonzalez and 
Wolfenzon (2012), and Schoar and Zuo (2008).  The sports sector offers opportunities for strong papers on the 
effects of coaches on performance (Bridgewater, Kahn, and Goodall, 2011; Dawson, Dobson, Gerrard, 2000; Frick 
and Simmons, 2008; Goodall, Kahn, and Oswald, 2011; Kahn, 1993; and Porter and Scully, 1982).  Recent work in 
education studies the effects of principals (Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin, 2012).  Regarding hierarchy and 
managers in law firms see Garicano and Hubbard (2007).  Regarding university leaders, see Goodall (2009a, b). 
Regarding national leaders, see Jones and Olken (2005).  Regarding church leaders, see Engelberg, Fisman, Hartzell, 
and Parsons (2012). Regarding personal traits and leadership, see Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) and Borghans, ter 
Weel, and Weinberg (2008).   Early theoretical work includes Herbert Simon on firm size and compensation (1957) 
and Rosen on the span of managerial control (1982).  For more recent work on leadership, see Hermalin (1998), 
Rotemberg and Saloner (2000), and Lazear (2012).   
3
An exception is Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).  In these models, a supervisor is 
effective because of differences in knowledge, and the supervisor’s task is to help production workers solve 
exceptional problems that arise.  A supervisor’s productivity and span of control is determined by the arrival rate of 
problems that can be solved directly by subordinates compared to the problems that can be solved by the worker 
4 
The neglect is even more striking when contrasted with the interest in peer effects.  There 
is a large literature, both theoretical and more recently empirical, that has focused on the effects 
of workers on their peers and team members.
4
  Peer effects may be important, but except in a few
industries, like academia, where the structure is very flat and workers have much authority over 
what they do, the relationship with one’s boss is likely to be as or more important than that to 
any other worker.  At a minimum, this remains an open question and one that should be 
investigated. 
By using data from a large services company with individual-level records of 
productivity, it is possible to examine the effect of bosses on their workers’ productivity and to 
compare them to individual worker effects.  Daily productivity is measured for 23,878 workers 
matched to 1,940 bosses over five years from June 2006 through May 2010, resulting in 
5,729,508 worker-day measures of productivity.  The productivity data are from one production 
task that we label a TBS job, or “technology-based service” job.  The workers are monitored by a 
computer which provides a measure of productivity.  Companies that have TBS jobs like this one 
include those with retail sales clerks, movie theater concession stand employees, in-house IT 
specialists, airline gate agents, call center workers, technical repair workers, and a host of other 
jobs in which an employee is logged into a computer while working.  Because of confidentiality 
restrictions, details about the day-to-day tasks of the workers cannot be revealed for this 
company. 
The primary findings are: 
1. Bosses vary greatly in productivity.  The difference between the best bosses
and worst bosses is significant.  Replacing a boss who is in the lower 10
th
percentile of boss quality with one who is at the 90
th
 percentile increases a
team’s total output by about the same amount as would adding one worker to
a nine member team.
2. Using what we believe is a conservative normalization, the average boss adds
about 1.75 times as much output as the average worker, which is in line with
the differences in pay received by the two types of employees.
under the supervisor’s direction.  The production environment analyzed here has some similarities in that bosses 
may teach workers how to deal with new problems, but the time spent solving problems for workers is limited.   
4
 For theory, see Kandel and Lazear (1992).  For empirical examples, see Mas and Moretti (2009), and Falk and 
Ichino (2006).  For work on teams and complementarities, see Ichniowski and Shaw (2003). 
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3. The component that differentiates the effect of particular bosses on workers is
not highly persistent.  About one-fourth of the boss-specific effect remains
one year after the worker leaves a particular boss.
4. The worst bosses are more likely to separate from the firm.  Bosses in the
lowest 10% of the quality distribution are over twice as likely to leave the firm
as bosses in the top 90% of the distribution.
5. Workers who are assigned to better bosses are more likely to remain with the
firm, which is another aspect of boss productivity.
6. The effect of good bosses on high quality workers is greater than the effect of
good bosses on lower quality workers, but the effect of sorting is not large.
I.  Theoretical Framework 
A.  Human Capital and Effort 
An individual worker i’s output at time t, qit, depends on human capital, Hit, which 
reflects both innate ability and previously learned skills, and on effort, Eit.  A natural (although 
not necessary) specification is multiplicative: harder work results in greater returns to human 
capital 
(1) ititit EHq  . 
A worker’s stock of human capital at time t depends on experiences with current and 
previous bosses, other variables, the set of which is denoted Xit, and some innate ability, denoted 
αi.  Then 
(2)  itiitit baXHH ,,
where bit is the quality-adjusted boss time that a worker has encountered over his career up to 
time t.  If the team m to which the worker is assigned contains one boss and Nm workers, then 
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where djt is an index of the difference between the quality of boss j with whom worker i is paired 
at time t and the mean boss quality, Njt is the size of that team,  dmt-1 is the quality of boss m with 
whom the worker is paired at time t-1, Nmt-1 is the size of that team, and so forth, and θ is a 
parameter that relates to the public or private nature of boss time, as described below. Note that 
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the identity of boss m may be the same or may differ from that of boss j.  Furthermore, this 
specification allows past bosses to affect the worker’s output at time t because some of the 
knowledge and work habits acquired from those bosses may be retained. 
If boss time is like individual tutoring, then θ=1.  Boss time is purely private so that time 
spent with one worker cannot be spent with another and has no spillover value to other workers.  
If boss time is like a lecture, then θ=0. The boss’s instruction or motivation improves all workers 
and there is no congestion.  For 0< θ<1, there is some public good aspect to boss time and some 
private good aspect.  A private good is one with total congestion.
5
Analogously, effort is 
(4)  itiitit baXZE ,,
Substituting (2), (3) and (4) into (1) yields 
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or 
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The linear form is a specific version of (5) that will be used in the empirical analysis and 
(5) becomes 
(6) 
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where α0 is the ability level of the mean worker and d0t is the ability level of the mean boss.  
Thus, the expectation of both the αi and of the djt is definitionally zero.  Although this model 
writes α0 and d0t as separate parameters, identifying them separately is difficult in practice. 
A contemporaneous-effects only version of (6) is 
(7)   
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jt
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5
 Lazear (2001) proposes a teaching model that has a public good structure, with congestion of a particular form.  It 
relates more closely to classroom teaching, however, because the actions of one student have a direct and particular 
effect on another.  The form used in (3) is less well-structured than that in Lazear (2001), but allows for a more 
general characterization of workplace interaction, where boss-worker instruction could be purely private.  In Lazear 
(2001), there is no private instruction; all students are learning or no students are learning.  Formally, there is no 
allowance for one student learning while the other is not unless classroom size was reduced to one student.  
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The contemporaneous boss effect on any single worker is then 
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effect of boss j on all workers that she supervises is 
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(8) Boss effect on productivity =    10 jttjt Ndd . 
The boss effects can vary over time for three reasons.  First, the worker’s boss today may 
differ from the one that he had in the past.  Second, the influence of a boss may diminish (or 
even possibly increase) as time passes.  Third, the second day with a boss does not necessarily 
have the same value as the first day. It may be that most of what is to be learned gets learned 
quickly, in which case the marginal effect of boss time on worker productivity diminishes with 
time spent with that boss.  An alternative is that it takes time to learn to communicate with a 
boss, which would mean that the second day with her is more valuable than the first. Note that 
this time effect is different from that of boss effects diminishing with time that has passed since 
the boss encounter.  Because (6) allows the identity of the boss at time t-q to differ from that at 
time t-q-1, the structure allows for diminishing or increasing returns to spending time with given 
boss as well as allowing bosses who were encountered longer ago to have different effects from 
those encountered more recently.  
Why would the boss effect persist over time?  Bosses in the context in which we study 
are most important in their ability to teach and to motivate workers.  For the most part, they do 
not engage in task assignment, hiring, or other aspects of the supervisor job, although they may 
play some role in firing and in promotion.  One might expect that the motivation effect of bosses 
works primarily through effort and that the teaching role of bosses works primarily through skill 
level, but there is nothing in the specification that requires this. A good boss may teach or 
motivate and these effects may persist over time.   
Bosses also have some endowment of skills and these skills need not be uni-dimensional.  
For example, it may be that nature endows boss skills such that good teachers are also good 
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motivators.  Or the endowments may be negatively correlated:  Good drill sergeants may make 
terrible psychotherapists.  There may be some ability to trade these skills off.  A boss with any 
given set of endowed skills might be able to turn one into another by spending a larger fraction 
of time focused on teaching or motivating. 
This framework suggests the following empirical questions: 
E1:  Do bosses matter?  Specifically, do they raise workers’ output?  If so, by how much? 
E2:  Do bosses vary in their quality? 
E3:  Do past bosses influence workers’ current output?  Are boss effects persistent?  
B.  The Allocation of Bosses to Workers 
Allocating bosses to workers may have significant effects on productivity. There are two 
aspects of allocation that may be important. The first involves team size.  The second is pairing a 
given worker with the right boss for him.  
Consider team size first and the simplest problem of allocating N identical workers 
among two bosses, j and k.  Boss j has a team of Nj workers, which leaves boss k with N-Nj 
workers.  As before, since the workers are identical, the i subscript is dropped.  Then the goal is 
to choose Nj so as to maximize the output of the two teams taken together.  Thus, choose Nj to 
maximize 
(9)   kjjj qNNqN 
where qj and qk are given by (6).  
Optimization requires that the first order condition holds 
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Eq. (10) implies that as long as θ > 0, team size increases in dj.
6
 The larger team is allocated to
6
Using the implicit function theorem on (10), 
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the boss with the greater effect on productivity.  This makes sense.  If there were no constraints 
on boss time, all workers would be allocated to the best boss.  But spreading a boss too thin hurts 
worker productivity so the lower quality boss gets some workers as well as long as θ>0.  Were 
θ=0 so that boss time was completely public, it would make sense to choose the corner solution 
of assigning all worker to the highest quality boss.
7
A second question is whether good bosses should be matched with good workers or with 
bad workers. It is conceivable that good bosses are more valuable to less able workers because 
the most able workers can learn by themselves and are innately highly motivated.  The reverse is 
also possible.  The best workers may be able to take better advantage of the knowledge and 
motivation that a good boss passes on. Below, the assumption of no interaction effects between 
boss quality and worker quality is tested and found to be very close to true.  
Additional empirical questions associated with worker allocation are:   
E4:   Are team sizes adjusted in a way consistent with optimality that gives the higher quality 
bosses larger teams?   
E5:  Comparative Advantage:  To which workers should the best bosses be assigned?  Do good 
bosses improve productivity more for the best workers (stars) or more for the worst workers 
(laggards)? 
II. The Data, the Company, and the Assignment of Workers to Bosses
The data are from an extremely large service company that has daily records on worker 
output linked to the boss to which the worker was assigned on each day.
8
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which is positive since the second-order condition is negative for an interior maximum. 
7
Rosen (1982) suggests that managers in top positions should be assigned more workers because the higher 
productivity of these managers will filter down in the organization when there is a recursive chain of control 
technology.  For papers suggesting a similar scale-of-operations effect, see Mayer (1960), Lucas (1978), and 
Garicano (2000).   
8
 In the data, the boss is recorded as the regular boss for that day.  If there was a substitute boss, say because the 
usual boss was absent, this would not be picked up in the record. 
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June, 2006 to May, 2010.  There are 23,878 workers and 1,940 bosses.  The unit of analysis is a 
worker-day and there are about 5.7 million worker-days over the entire period. 
The company has multiple service functions, but the data used come from job code 
classification where workers are involved in one task involving general customer transactions.  
The task is one that is repeated, but each experience has some idiosyncrasies.  The choice of one 
task for analysis ensures that all workers in the sample are engaged in the same activity. 
To provide some context, consider an example of a technology-based service job where  
workers do computer-based test grading.  In most states, students take standardized tests, such as 
the “Star” tests in California.  The students’ handwritten essays (in subjects from science to 
English) are scanned into a computer, and then the graders of these tests sit in large rooms, 
where they grade each essay on a computer.  The graders’ work is timed and checked for quality.  
Graders must be at their desk a certain percent of the day (defined as ‘uptime’ below), which is 
recorded, and they have modest amounts of incentive pay.  They are given frequent feedback on 
their performance.  Their bosses sit with them to teach them grading skills and to motivate the 
workers.  While this may seem like an unusual example, we made a number of visits to 
companies like this and all visits shared this typical scenario. 
These jobs are labeled technology-based service jobs because the company uses some 
form of advanced IT system to record the beginning and ending time for each transaction, or to 
record the daily volume of transactions, for each worker.  As described above, many production 
processes in services now fit this description.  The technology that is used to measure 
performance may be a new computer-based monitoring system (as in the standardized test 
grading above), an ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) system that records a worker’s 
productivity each day (such as the number of windshield repair visits done by each Safelite 
worker (Lazear, 1999; Shaw and Lazear, 2008)), cash registers that record each transaction under 
an employee ID number, call centers, or computer-monitored data entry.  These technology-
based service jobs are likely to be widespread and represent a major IT-based shift in 
computerization and measurement of worker productivity.  Although some of these jobs are 
outsourced to firms outside the U.S., many remain in the U.S., particularly when the customer 
interaction is face-to-face or the work is idiosyncratic and skilled (as in test grading). 
The technology-based service workers studied herein are constantly learning.  New 
products or processes are introduced over time so there is learning by workers and the potential 
11 
for teaching by bosses on the job. 
The core measure of productivity is output-per-hour (OPH).  The computer system 
measures the time it takes for each transaction and from this, the number of transactions per hour 
is calculated.  Slack time, when the worker is not facing a transaction, is not measured because 
OPH is calculated as (60 / average minutes per transaction).  Each worker handles about 10.3 
transactions per hour.
9
A second measure of performance is uptime.  In any hour at work, workers miss some 
time for breaks and personal time, leaving their work areas and thereby slowing the entire 
system.  This is rare.  The mean uptime is 96.3%.  Most of the variation in productivity is in 
output-per-hour rather than in uptime.  The standard deviation of output-per-hour is 30.8% of its 
mean; the standard deviation of uptime is 2.8% of its mean.  Consequently, the empirical 
analysis focuses on output per hour.  
A final measure of productivity is quality.  Quality is measured on a score of 0 to 5 and is 
collected approximately weekly for each worker using a randomly administered post-transaction 
survey.  The quality data is sparse and was not used heavily by the management at the company, 
so for these reasons, it is de-emphasize in the analysis that follows.   
Work takes place in “areas” and the group of workers associated with a given area is 
labeled a “team.”  The average daily team size is 9.04 workers and each team is managed by one 
boss.  The team is identified through the worker’s link to a boss identification number; all 
workers with the same boss that day are said to be part of the team. As in the grading example, 
there is no obvious interaction among team members.   
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the productivity measures and the extent of boss 
switching.  Each boss interacts with, on average, about 50 different workers, and each worker 
has, on average, about 4 different bosses in the sample.   
The identification of boss effects on workers’ productivity comes from the movement of 
workers between bosses so an important issue is the method of assignment of workers to bosses.  
Workers switch bosses about two to three times per year.
10
  New workers who enter the company
randomly fill in open spots due to worker attrition.  The firm also has a policy to occasionally re-
9
  In Lazear, Shaw and Stanton (2013), the relation of productivity to demand conditions is explored in more detail. 
10
 The worker-boss pair is defined by the usual worker-boss pairing.  If a boss were absent on any given day, the 
usual boss would be the one of record. 
12 
assign experienced workers and bosses.  This policy was in place to deal with two issues related 
to attrition.  First, teams needed to be re-balanced, where the goal of re-balancing is to balance 
the number of experienced relative to inexperienced on the team.  Second, many employees 
required accommodations due to changing schedules outside of work, and re-assignment allowed 
employees to adjust their shift rather than leave the firm.  In interviews with the company, we 
were told that when assignments to bosses were rotated that management played no centralized 
role in assigning workers to bosses.  Workers with superior recent production tended to be given 
precedent in choosing their shifts, but the process was described as haphazard and subject to 
change over time.  The high amount turnover at the firm, the need to keep team sizes balanced, 
and the need to switch shifts are the primary force behind worker mobility across teams.  
One concern is that the potential for non-random sorting affects the ability to estimate 
boss effects.  The theory above suggests that the number of workers assigned to a boss should 
depend on the quality of the boss.  This does not imply that there should be any correlation 
between boss quality and worker quality, which is a separate issue and depends on comparative 
advantage.  It is the latter issue, not team size, that is the primary concern.  There are several 
formal statistical tests for non-random sorting in later sections that suggest that random 
assignment prevails.   
III. The Basic Results
The empirical approach is to estimate the stochastic version of equation (6) above written as 
(11) 
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Each boss j’s quality is assumed in (11) to be invariant over time, although it is possible 
conceptually, but not econometrically (the boss tenure data is not observed), to allow boss effects 
to vary with boss tenure just as worker productivity varies with worker tenure.  To ensure 
notation is clear, the t subscript on djt/N
θ
 jt is the effect of boss quality on current productivity, qit,
when a worker is matched with boss j at time t.  Indexing by t captures the history of past boss 
assignments, allowing the effect of past bosses to persist in a general way. 
The error term, νit, may simply be classical error or it may be composed of two 
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components: classical error, εit, and a term, φijt, which captures interaction or match effects 
between the worker and the boss with whom the worker is paired at time t.  It is conceivable that 
worker i is better suited to boss j than to boss k and φij allows that generality. In that case, (11) is 
written as  
(12) 
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A contemporaneous-effects only version of (12) that will be used in some of the estimation is 
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Estimation begins with equation (13).  A version of (13) that constrains θ to be equal to 0, i.e., 
assumes that boss effects are completely public, is also estimated as 
 (14) itijtjttitiit ddXaaq   00 . 
A.  A Preview of Estimation Issues 
Before discussing the estimates, it is important to flag a few potential problems that may 
arise in estimation.  First, as already mentioned, there may be non-random assignment of 
workers to bosses.   As an empirical matter, assignment is close to random. Even it were not,  if 
worker quality is measured well and the functional form of the estimating equation is properly 
specified
11
, then non-random assignment is does not present a problem.  A standard control for
worker quality is the inclusion of worker effects.   If good workers are more frequently assigned 
to good bosses, there is no bias in the estimates of the boss effect as long as the model controls 
adequately for worker quality.  That is, as long as sorting is on the time-invariant worker or boss 
11
 Required is that the error term after accounting for worker quality is not correlated with boss assignment. In many 
contexts with linked employer-firm data, one may be concerned that the workers who switch firms differ from the 
workers who do not switch.  In the company studied here, workers switch bosses frequently and these switches 
occur at pre-specified times, alleviating some concern that only a selected set of workers switch bosses. 
14 
effect and not on the recent history of residuals, then assortative matching does not bias the 
estimates.  In addition to adding worker effects to control for worker quality, there are more 
sophisticated and more comprehensive ways both to test for the extent of the non-random 
assignment problem and to treat it.  A variety of methods will be used and described in more 
detail in the subsequent analysis of Section VII.  All approaches yield the same qualitative 
conclusions that non-random assignment is unlikely to be a serious problem in interpreting the 
estimates.   
B.  Estimation Methods 
The first step in estimating the impact of bosses on productivity is to estimate the 
productivity regression (13) to recover the effects of contemporaneous bosses on output.  
Equation (13) restricts the effect of past bosses on current worker output to be zero but permits 
bosses’ effects to have a public and private component, θ; the equation also allows the effect of 
boss j on one worker to differ from that on another worker through the match effects, φijt.   
The first set of estimates shown in Table 2 employs a mixed model specification.
 12
   The
mixed effects specification treats αi and dj as random effects but allows arbitrary correlation 
between the random effects design matrix Z = [A B M] and X, where A, B, and M are matrices 
of worker, boss and match indicators and X is the matrix of other right hand side variables. This 
is in contrast to the more widely known random effects estimator that requires orthogonality 
between the random effects design matrix Z and X.  The identifying assumptions are:  
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where I#W, I#B, and I#M are identity matrices with sizes corresponding to the numbers of workers 
and bosses and the number of distinct matches in the data, respectively.  R is the covariance 
matrix of the errors, NI
2
   The covariance parameters
2
d ,
2
a , and
2
 are estimated via restricted 
maximum likelihood, using the procedure detailed in Abowd, Kramarz, and Woodcock (2006). 
12
Throughout the remainder of the paper, details about the estimation procedures are contained in the notes 
accompanying each table. 
15 
In some later applications, recovering individual boss, worker, and match effects rather 
than just the distributional parameters is necessary.  To do so, we use Henderson’s mixed model 
equations to recover best linear unbiased predictors (BLUPS) of the individual effects (see 
Abowd, Kramarz, and Woodcock (2006) for a discussion on the history of this method).  Letting 
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C. Results 
The key message in Table 2 is that bosses matter and differ substantially. Column 1 
reports the results from the estimating equation (13).  The standard deviation of the boss effect is 
large, equaling 4.74 units of output, whereas the standard deviation of worker effects is only 
1.33.
13
  There is a large literature in labor economics that emphasizes how differences in
workers’ underlying ability affect their productivity or their wages rates.  Here, the variance of 
the boss effects dwarfs that of worker effects.  
The estimate of θ equal to .3 in column (1) implies that bosses are engaged in both public 
and private mentoring. 
14
  Were boss time completely private, θ would equal 1 and, from (7), the
total effect of the boss would simply be djt.  At the other extreme, if θ=0, then the effect of boss 
time would be djt˟Njt. With an estimated θ of 0.30 and an average team size of 9.04, the boss 
effect equals 4.67 djt., which means that boss time is about half way between being purely private 
and purely public.  One interpretation is that about half of what a boss teaches is done in a 
common setting, with the rest taking the form of private tutoring.
15
13
 The standard deviation of boss effects is calculated as the standard deviation of the boss random coefficients, a 
parameter that is estimated directly, times (average team size)
1-θ
. The expectation of the mixed effects is zero over 
the entire sample, so pairing a boss with the typical worker yields a boss effect that has an expected value equal to 
djt.  It is that standard deviation that is reported in Table 2. 
14
  The estimate of θ is recovered using an outer loop to search over θ; in an inner loop the REML estimates 
condition on each guess of θ.  This is repeated until a value of θ is found that maximizes the REML likelihood.   
15
    The variance of worker and match effects is not sensitive to the value of θ.  To assess the sensitivity of the 
16 
Columns 2 through 4 present other variations of the model. All specifications contain 
tenure controls given by a fifth order polynomial in tenure.
16
 
17
  Not surprisingly, and consistent
with prior work in other industries,
18
 worker output is increasing and concave in tenure.
Regressions that include only contemporaneous boss effects include day of the week dummies 
and month dummies, which capture technological change and demand conditions, to the extent 
that they are relevant.
19
Column 2 estimates equation (12) introducing lagged boss effects.  The lags are based on 
the identity of the bosses six and twelve months ago.
20
  Because the data do not include complete
production histories for experienced workers at the time our sample begins, we use only 
observations on experienced workers with greater than six months of tenure.  In column 2, the 
value of θ is constrained to be .3 from column 1.21  When the lagged boss effects are included,
the standard deviation of contemporaneous boss effects is 4.08.  Although the standard deviation 
drops somewhat from that estimated in column 1, the estimate is in the same range and still much 
greater than that for worker effects.
22
  It is possible to infer the degree to which boss effects
estimates, θ was also constrained to 0.25 and 0.35.  The standard deviation of the boss effects is, respectively, 5.10 
and 2.90.  The model fit according to AIC and BIC is worst when θ is constrained to 0.35. 
16
 For these jobs, a portion of the learning is firm-specific and a portion is occupation-specific, and the regressions 
do not hold constant the latter because the data contains only the start date with the current firm, not general 
occupational experience.  Therefore, the tenure coefficients combine firm-specific learning with occupational 
learning for those who did not arrive with previous occupational experience, but estimate firm-specific learning for 
those who arrived with previous experience. 
17
 For fixed effects models, because the month dummies and the tenure profile are nearly collinear within person, we 
estimate the tenure profile as           )365(*365136513651 ftentenLtenftenteng  , where f is a fifth
order polynomial over the first year.
 
Estimates of ℒ suggest that the discrete jump at day 365 is less than 3% of the 
total effect of tenure.  Alternative assumptions about the tenure profile do not change the magnitude of worker and 
boss effects.  
18
 See Lazear (2000), Shaw and Lazear (2008) for examples of estimated productivity-tenure profiles. 
19 Although the measure of output is average transaction time (from which output-per-hour is inferred), it is possible 
that workers might speed up when there is a long queue of customers waiting for service.  Whether market 
conditions affect output depends on how good the firm is at adjusting the number of employees at work so as to keep 
the transaction arrival rate close to constant for any given worker, despite varying demand conditions.  In our 
discussions with the firm, we know that the firm attempts to adjust the number of hours worked so as to minimize 
slack.  Still, there is variation in part because the firm must observe slack persisting for a long enough period of time 
before it makes sense to send some workers home. 
20
 The data have gaps, so if the worker was not observed in the data exactly 6 or 12 months previously, we use the 
identity of the worker’s last boss prior to this date.  We have also estimated the model after aggregating to the 
monthly level, using the modal boss in a month as an indicator for the lagged boss.  Results using daily data or data 
aggregated to the monthly level are qualitatively similar.   
21
 The value of θ is constrained rather than estimated in models with lags because of computational complexity.  As 
the number of random effects dimensions increases, the computational difficulty in fitting the model increases, 
making it difficult to estimate θ. 
22
 In this specification, θ is constrained to be .3 to be consistent with that obtained in column (1). 
17 
persist over time by comparing contemporaneous effects to lagged effects.  More is said on this 
below in section F. 
Column 3 of Table 2 constrains θ to be zero and deletes lagged boss effects for the 
estimation of equation (14).  The variation of bosses on productivity remains high, with the 
standard deviation of boss effects now equal to 4.104.   
For comparability with other techniques, column 4 presents boss effects estimated using 
the more widely-known fixed effects method.  In this case, a productivity regression is run that 
includes boss and worker fixed effects. This specification imposes the assumption that the boss 
effect is completely public, that is, that θ=0. Now, the standard deviation of the boss effects is 
3.44, which is still about 2.5 times as large as the standard deviation of the worker fixed effects 
themselves.
23
  It is reassuring that the basic conclusion is not sensitive to the version of the
model that is estimated or to the estimation method used. That said, there are numerous 
advantages to the mixed effects method over the fixed effects method.  First, the mixed effects 
specification allows estimation of worker-boss match effects.  Second, fixed effects suffer from a 
problem with sampling error, so determining the true variance of the boss effects is difficult.  
The mixed effects specification permits estimation of the variance of boss, worker, and match 
effects directly. Still, no matter the estimation method, there is significant variation in the quality 
of bosses that is reflected in the amount by which they can affect the productivity of the teams 
that they supervise.  
The last column of Table 2 presents results where quality is the dependent variable.  The 
most important finding is that the boss effects on the output-per-hour dimension are positively 
correlated with the boss effects on the quality dimension.  A good boss appears to be a good boss 
in general and does not reduce quality to get faster transaction times.  In addition, the magnitude 
of boss effects on quality compared to worker effects remains large and is large relative to the 
standard deviation of the quality effect (equal also to .78). 
23
 This is calculated by taking the standard deviation of the estimated boss fixed effects, weighted by the number of 
worker-day observations. A boss effect estimated with a small numbers of workers for that boss will have more 
sampling error than a boss fixed effect estimated off a large number of workers.  Because of the inconsistency of the 
individual fixed effects estimates in short panels, sampling variation is non-negligible.  Weighting the fixed effects 
by the observations in the sample reduces the influence of sampling error on estimates of the distribution of the true 
fixed effects. This is done in the last column of Table 2. 
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The fact that there is variation in the effects of bosses on output means that bosses must 
affect output in the first place.  There are two notions of the impact of bosses.  One is the 
increase in productivity that a typical worker would achieve by moving from a poor boss to a 
good boss.  The other is the increase in the productivity of all team members resulting from more 
time with the average boss. 
Mixed estimation assumes a normal distribution of boss effects, which implies that the 
boss who is at the 90
th
 percentile of the boss quality distribution increases productivity by 6.07
units/hour more than the boss at the 50
th
 percentile.  Comparably, replacing a boss who is in the
lowest 10
th
 percentile of boss quality with one who is at the 90
th
 percentile increases a team’s
total output by about the same amount as would adding one worker to a nine member team. 
It is important to remember that the estimates of boss effects are lower bounds on the 
variance in boss effects because of selection.  The worst conceivable boss is not likely to be in 
our sample of bosses.  Consequently, the observed distribution is likely to be a truncated version 
of the underlying potential distribution of boss effects.  Even if the distribution of boss effects 
had no variance, this would not mean that bosses did not matter.  It would merely imply that all 
bosses affected worker output to the same extent.  The conclusion is that even among the 
selected sample of those who are employed as bosses, there is large variation in the effect of 
bosses on worker output. 
The fact that bosses vary significantly in their productivity-enhancement effects implies 
by necessity that bosses must matter.  It can only be the case that a good boss affects productivity 
by much more than a bad boss when bosses affect productivity in the first place.  If bosses were 
mere decorations, one would expect no variation in boss effects beyond sampling error.  The fact 
there is wide variation in boss effects implies that there is a substantial productivity effect that 
bosses confer on their teams. 
There are a number of ways to estimate the absolute productivity level of the boss effect 
and none is without problems.
24
 One normalization that may be reasonable and on which
evidence is provided below, is based on the idea that those who are bosses are promoted from 
worker to boss are superior to the best workers.  Bosses obtain and retain their jobs only by being 
24
 For example, implicit in (13) is an estimate that comes from d0, but this places very heavy weight on variations in 
team size to identify the effect of the boss on workers. The major concern is that team size variation is modeled to 
affect output only through the boss effect, but any other effects would also be captured in d0. 
 D.  The Impact of Bosses 
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more productive as bosses than they would be as workers.  Otherwise, comparative advantage 
would dictate that they operate as workers rather than bosses.
25
  It is also reasonable to expect
that those who are promoted to boss are identified as being more able than the average worker 
because they were exceptional producers when they were workers themselves.  Of course, 
promotion mistakes can be and are made, but they tend to be weeded out (as shown later).
26
Therefore, let us assume that the poorest bosses have productivity that is equal to that of the 
better workers.  Specifically, assume that the boss who is at the 10
th
 percentile of the boss quality
distribution is as productive as a worker who is at the 90
th
 percentile of the worker quality
distribution. The 10
th
 percentile boss is then worth about 12 transactions per hour, which is the
number of units that the 90
th
 percentile worker produces in a typical hour.  Given this benchmark
and knowledge of the parameters of the distributions governing worker and boss effects, it is 
possible to calculate the level of productivity for every boss. 
This normalization implies that the average boss produces about 18 transactions per hour 
in enhanced productivity of that boss’s subordinates.  Were no bosses present, the typical team of 
nine workers would handle 18 fewer transactions per hour on a mean of about 100 transactions. 
This implies that the average boss is about 1.75 times as productive as the average worker.   This 
is consistent with our discussions with the firm on levels of compensation.  No compensation 
data are available to us, but we were told that bosses, who are almost twice as productive as 
workers by this measure, earn between 1.5 to 2 times as much as workers. 
E.  The Boss Effects are Identified  
The intuition behind identifying the boss effects comes from the fact that workers switch 
bosses frequently.  The change in worker productivity associated with the switch to a new boss 
provides the relevant information for identifying the boss effect.   In order to estimate the effect 
of a boss on workers’ productivity, the same boss must work with different workers, whose 
abilities are known through the worker effects. For any given boss, the boss effect is therefore 
estimated as the average increase across all workers who work for that boss when they switch to 
that boss (or average decrease when they switch from that boss).   
More precisely, the boss effects are estimated within “groups” of connected workers in 
25
 For a model that analyzes the choice of boss versus production worker and other hierarchies see Garicano (2000). 
26
 See Lazear (2004) for a theoretical exposition of promotion decisions under uncertainty and the effects of error. 
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the graph-theoretic sense.
27
  If a separate group of bosses and workers is not connected, no
worker nor boss ever interacts with any other worker or boss in the non-connected group.  
Within each group, there must be one normalization of the boss effects and one normalization of 
the worker effects. 
The data are sufficient to estimate the boss effects within each connected group. For each 
worker, there is an average of 240 days of daily productivity data (or about a calendar year of 
data).  Each worker changes bosses about 4.7 times during this interval.  Therefore, when the 
boss is the unit of analysis, her team members have, on average, touched 4.7 other bosses.  Given 
the average number of workers per boss, the number of worker changers per boss is 49 (or 80 if 
weighted by the number of observations per boss).  These are sizable numbers.  As a result, 
99.99% of the daily data is in the largest connected group, with only 560 of the 5.7 million 
observations and 11 of the 1,940 bosses outside of the largest connected group. 
F. Persistence of Boss Productivity Effects 
Some of the knowledge or motivation that bosses pass to their subordinates may be 
fleeting, but some may persist for extended periods of time.  Skills that are taught might stay 
with the worker longer than contemporaneous motivation that comes from encouragement or 
threats that vanish once the boss is no longer present.  It is tempting to refer to the part of the 
boss effect that persists as teaching and that which dies out quickly as motivation.  
Unfortunately, no evidence on the cause or nature of the boss productivity is available.  
Consequently, we choose to refer simply to persistence, which is the amount of the boss effect 
that is retained for six or twelve months.  The results in column 2 of Table 2 shed some light on 
this issue. 
To see this, recall that xtjxt dd  0  is defined as the effect of the boss with whom the 
worker was paired at time t-x on output at time t.  Define  

  xtjxt dd0  as the effect of the boss 
with whom the worker was paired at time t-x on output at time t-x.  Then the persistence 
parameters, λ0x and λx, are the part of the effect of the boss on output at time t-x that remains at 
time t, or  



  xtjxxtxxtjxt dddd  000
27
 Paraphrasing, “When a group of [workers] and [bosses] is connected, the group contains all the [workers] who 
ever worked for any of the [bosses] in the group and all the [bosses] to which any of the workers were ever 
assigned” (Abowd, Kramarz, and Woodcock, 2006). 
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The two persistence parameters have different interpretations.  λ0x is the amount of the average 
boss effect from time t-x that persists until time t whereas λx is the part of the idiosyncratic boss 
effect from time t-x that persists until time t.  It follows that  
xtjdxxtdj   
If the dj distribution is stationary, then σd*j t-x = σd*j t , which implies that 
 tdjxtjd  
so an estimate of λx is given by 
(15) 
tdj
xtdj
x 

 
 which can be obtained from column 2 of Table 2. 
Because there are six and twelve months lags included in the specification, λ6 and λ12 can 
be estimated from the ratio of the standard deviations in the relevant dj t - x.  The estimates of λ6 
and λ12 suggests that about 35 percent of the current boss effect persists for six months and 26 
percent persists for one year. 
This result does not imply that what bosses do does not persist. For example, it might be 
the case that most of what bosses do is convey skills that workers learn early and keep with them 
for a long time.  If all bosses are equally good at providing persistent skills, then this effect is 
contained in the d0 component, rather than in the dj component. Although there is persistence, it 
does not differ in the cross-section of bosses and therefore is not reflected in the ratio of the 
standard deviations.  It is also possible that bosses differ in their ability to motivate workers. 
Once the worker leaves the boss, contemporaneous motivation is lost. That would be picked up 
in the dj factor.  These contemporaneous motivation effects might die out rapidly, which would 
be consistent with two-thirds being gone after six months.  
Even if most of the effect, including that which does not vary across bosses, was 
contemporaneous, this would not imply that bosses are unimportant.  If the effect of having a 
good boss is fleeting, keeping the worker paired with a good boss is all the more important.  
Were the skills that were learned kept forever, then it would only be necessary to make sure that 
a worker encountered a good boss at one point, preferably early, in his career.  If the boss effects 
22 
die out quickly, then having a larger stock of good bosses is required to achieve the same level of 
output.  
IV. Another Measure of Boss Productivity: Worker Retention
The adage, “workers don’t leave bad firms, they leave bad bosses” can be tested.  Since 
turnover is costly, a boss who causes workers to leave when the firm would profit by having 
them retained is implicitly a low productivity boss.  Let us define “bad boss” by the dj that is 
estimated by examining the effect of the boss on worker output-per-hour.  If workers dislike 
bosses with low dj, then one might expect that there would be a correlation between worker 
departure hazard rates and dj.  This is not unreasonable. Workers may prefer to work with bosses 
who make them productive, perhaps because good bosses enhance worker promotion 
probabilities the most and thus raise the worker’s future wage.  
Table 3 reports the results of a Cox proportional hazard model where worker departure is 
the dependent variable.  Because the data do not contain details about attrition versus promotions 
out of the sample, the analysis is conducted on two separate samples.  The first four columns of 
Table 3 provide estimates of the model on a sub-sample of workers with fixed effects αi below 
the mean.  These workers are unlikely to be promoted, alleviating concerns about classification 
error in measuring departures.  The remaining columns include the full sample of workers.   
Coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table 3, but the exponentiated 
coefficients are most easy to interpret.  The first row of Table 3 (labeled “Boss Effect x Team 
Size ^ -θ”) shows that the effect of dj on turnover is negative.  Good bosses as measured by their 
best linear unbiased predictor of the boss effect do indeed reduce worker turnover.  This is true in 
every specification and the effect is significant.  The effect is not only statistically significant, it 
is sizeable.  A boss who is one standard deviation above the mean quality in dj (the standard 
deviation of dj equals 1.015 at the individual worker level) experiences a 12 percent reduction in 
the turnover hazard among her workers.  
It is also true (see columns 2 and 4), that workers who are in the lowest decile of 
productivity as measured by their individual effects (αi) are more likely to leave the firm.  There 
is no significant interaction effect. It is not the case that good bosses are better at losing the worst 
workers in the firm (row 3). 
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V.  Worker - Boss Match Effects 
The treatment effect of boss quality on worker productivity may vary with the quality of 
the worker.  Heterogeneity in the treatment effect was permitted in equation (13) and Table 2, 
through the match effect, ijt . At a conceptual level, good bosses, especially those with teaching 
skills, may be most useful for those workers who have the toughest time learning or for those 
who have the most to learn.  But it is possible that the reverse is true: our most distinguished 
academics teach the best Ph.D. students, not kindergarteners, because the basic skills learned 
when young are easily taught by less skilled individuals. 
It is unclear, a priori, whether a new boss has a comparative advantage with a high human 
capital or a low human capital worker.  From (1), (2) and (4), note that  






q
b
H
E
b
E
H
b
  . 
Even if ∂E/ ∂b and ∂H/∂b were greater for the high H than for the low H workers, because high 
H workers have greater stocks of human capital, the sign is indeterminate.  As such, it is 
important to estimate this to determine how bosses should be sorted so as to make the most of 
comparative advantage.  
With estimates of ijt in hand from Table 2, it is possible to calculate whether good bosses 
should be matched to good workers or to bad workers.
28
  Note that the assumption of a diagonal
covariance matrix of the boss, worker, and match effects does not imply that the effect of a boss 
is uniform on each worker.  The possibility that better bosses should be matched with better 
workers can be assessed through the match effects.   There is nothing in the estimation that 
restricts cov(α+φ, d+ φ) to be zero. 
Bosses are classified as “good” or “bad” according to whether their estimated boss effect, 
dj, is above or below the median. Workers are also classified as “star” or “laggard” according to 
whether their estimated worker effect, αi, is above or below the median.   
The designations of good/bad bosses and star/laggard workers are formed from the 
distributions of the random boss and worker effects holding constant the match effect.  Because 
the match effects are unbiased, so too are the designations.  There are four cells of (good-boss, 
good-worker), (good-boss, bad worker), (bad-boss, good-worker), and (bad-boss, bad-worker).  
28
 We thank John Abowd for suggesting this approach and making clear its statistical properties. 
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To obtain estimates, all that is required is that some good bosses are matched with good workers, 
some bad bosses are matched with good workers, and some good bosses are matched with bad 
workers, and some bad bosses are matched with some bad workers.  Each of our four cells of 
boss/worker pairs for the good/bad combinations will measure the mean outcome for the quality 
groups designated.  
The results are contained in Table 4.  The top panel of Table 4 provides cell means for 
regression (13) with θ=.30 (based on column 1 of Table 2) and the bottom panel provides cell 
means for regression (14) for θ=0 (based on column 3 of Table 2).  The results do not differ 
between the two panels, so concentrate on the first more flexible model in the top panel.  
The issue here is one of comparative advantage: how best to allocate the bosses.  The 
results in Table 4 provide a clear answer. There are two choices.  Either good bosses are paired 
with stars, which implies that bad bosses are paired with laggards, or bad bosses are paired with 
stars, which implies that good bosses are paired with laggards. Combining good bosses with stars 
and bad with laggards yields an average match effect of .100-.063 =.037.  Combining bad bosses 
with stars and good with laggards yields an average match effect of -.083+.051=-0.032.  The 
value of bosses is maximized by assigning the better bosses to the better workers.  Workers and 
bosses should be matched positively because good bosses (defined as good for the average 
worker) increase the output of stars by more than they do of laggards.  Still, the effects are not 
large.  The net average gain from proper assignment over incorrect assignment is .037-(-
.032)=.069 on a mean output-per-worker hour of 10.26.  This is less than 1% of output. 
VI. Determination of Team Size across Bosses
Equation (10) implies that better bosses should have larger teams and yields a specific 
functional form for the relation of team size to boss effect.  To test this, assume the dj boss 
effects are estimated appropriately in (13), as reported in column 1 of Table 2.  Using the 
dj BLUPS from that model, it is possible to compute the correlation between the estimated 
dj (which reflects the entire four year time period) and the within-site-within-time period team 
size. The correlation is essentially zero, at -.019. 
29
   The firm does not appear to be allocating
workers appropriately to bosses, perhaps because it is difficult to determine the dj, .  The effect of 
29
 In contrast to these results, Smeets, Waldman, and Warzynski (2013) use data from a high tech manufacturing 
firm and find that the span of control of a manager is positively correlated with his performance rating. 
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a particular boss on workers is challenging to separate from worker effects and it could take 
considerable time to learn this, simply through observation, of worker output.   
VII. Non-random Assignment of Workers to Bosses
There may be non-random assignment of experienced workers to bosses.  This section 
presents evidence to assess whether non-random assignment is a concern for the estimates. The 
most likely source of non-random sorting is through assignment based on match-specific 
productivity, which is captured already.
30
  Still, it is useful to examine non-random assignment
and to consider any possible sensitivity of the estimates of the boss effects to non-random 
assignment that might result because of a specification different from the one assumed in (12)-
(14).  A series of tests suggests that non-random assignment, in this context, is unlikely to be a 
significant problem for the estimates of boss effects. 
A.  A Specification Test 
The mixed effects estimator provides a specification test to assess whether bosses and 
workers are sorted based on their idiosyncratic match effects.  To understand the logic behind the 
test, consider an alternative method to estimate the match effects based on the fixed effects 
estimator.  Jackson (2012) calls this alternative method the “orthogonal match fixed effects 
estimator,” in which the match effects are calculated as the mean of the residual for each boss-
worker pair after fixed effect estimation, where the mean is over all periods during which the 
boss and worker are together. The orthogonal match fixed effects estimator imposes that the 
mean of the match effects for each worker and each boss (although not for each boss-worker 
pair) is zero by construction.  In contrast, the mixed effects estimator allows the observed, actual 
match effects to deviate from zero for each boss and each worker. The mixed effects estimator 
instead imposes that the potential match effects are zero.  This means that if a boss and worker 
were paired at random, the expected match effect for bosses and for workers would be zero, but 
there is nothing that restricts the match effects to be mean zero for the actual subset of matches 
that do occur.
31
The implication is that the mean of the match effects for each worker and each boss 
30
 Recall that unbiased estimates of the mixed effects model do not hinge on random assignment of workers to 
bosses on match-specific productivity because that model includes boss-worker interactions (the φijt terms). 
31
 If the data were balanced, meaning that every boss and every worker were paired, then the match effects 
recovered from the orthogonal fixed effects estimator and the mixed effects estimator would both be mean zero.   
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(taking unique workers and then unique bosses as the units of analysis, respectively) will be zero 
in the mixed effects estimation if the assignment of workers to bosses is not based on the 
idiosyncratic match quality component.  If the assignment of workers to bosses is not random, 
then the estimated match effects from Table 2 are likely to deviate from zero within workers and 
within bosses because the worker to boss assignment process will reflect match specific 
productivity gains. That is, when averaging over actual matches, the mean of the actual matches 
may differ from the population mean of the matches if there is systematic sorting on 
idiosyncratic match-specific productivity.  It is important to note that this is not a test for 
assortative matching on the common boss and worker effect.  This is a test for matching on 
idiosyncratic match quality that does not covary with respect to the common boss effect and the 
common worker effect.  Sorting on the common worker and boss effect—both of which are 
general and invariant to the identity of the match—is not a problem for our estimates. 
Using the boss as the unit of analysis (which means taking the mean of the actual match 
effects BLUPs across workers for a given boss), the average boss match effect is 0.0014 with a 
standard error of the mean of 0.0018 (for estimates from column 1 of Table 2). When using the 
individual worker as the unit of analysis (which means taking the mean of the match effects 
across bosses that a given worker has had), the mean of the workers’ average match effect across 
workers is 0.0014 with a standard error of the mean of 0.0011.
32
  These results are consistent
with the identifying assumptions.  The zero means of the observed match effects within workers 
and bosses suggests that there is little sorting of workers to bosses on the basis of the expected 
match-specific component of productivity. 
Under the implications of standard matching models,
33
 workers would also be expected
to spend more time with those bosses with whom they are better matched.  Figure 1 provides 
estimates of the probability that a given worker switches bosses as a function of lagged residual 
productivity of the worker.  The logic is as follows:  if the firm or individual bosses and workers 
were sorting to maximize the productivity of boss-worker matches, then one would expect highly 
productive matches to endure.  For the exercise in Figure 1, a highly productive match can be 
32
 Due to the limited number of observed assignments, some workers or bosses with a sequence of lucky pairings are 
likely to have match effects that deviate from zero.  However, under the null hypothesis that assignment is 
independent of the latent match effect between bosses and workers, as the number of boss assignments increases for 
worker i, the mean match effect for worker i should converge to 0.  The same logic applies to the mean match effect 
for boss j. 
33
 See Jovanovic (1979). 
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operationalized as the within-worker residual from a restricted version of equation (6) that is 
estimated without boss effects or match effects.
34
  The residual captures the influence of a boss
in a very flexible way that relies on few assumptions.  Results from a local polynomial 
regression, contained in the figure, show that the probability that a worker switches bosses in the 
next month does not vary much as a function of lagged residual productivity in the prior month.  
The kernel density plot provides a measure of the variability of residual productivity.  Workers 
with high lagged productivity—possibly due to a match with a good boss—are about as likely to 
switch bosses in the next month as workers with low lagged productivity.  This suggests that 
taking assignment as random conditional on a worker effect is a reasonable assumption for 
estimating boss effects. 
B.  Using Randomly Assigned Workers to Validate the Estimates 
Other tests are available. The first examines whether the estimated boss effects predict 
well out of sample.  Interview evidence from visits to the company revealed that for the first 
assignment after being hired, the worker is randomly assigned to bosses, filling in on teams for 
workers who have departed.
35
  Because this is a high turnover job, much of the assignment is
driven by the stochastic nature of quits, reflecting the fact that new workers randomly fill open 
slots.
36
The assessment uses new workers who were allocated randomly to their first boss to 
conduct an out-of-sample validation exercise.  We estimate boss quality using data from older 
workers and then assess whether the boss quality measures recovered from these experienced 
workers predict the productivity of new workers.  If non-random sorting is confounding 
estimation of individual boss quality, the estimated boss effects should have little predictive 
power on the sample of randomly assigned new workers.  High predictive power, here, means 
that a regression of productivity for new-workers on the boss effects for older workers should 
have a coefficient of 1.   
34
 The residuals are taken from estimates of the equation ititiit Xaaoph   0  where Xit contains a fifth 
order polynomial in tenure, year-by-month fixed effects, and establishment fixed effects. 
35
 There remains the possibility that even the first assignment is not completely random if departures are more 
common for workers who are assigned to low quality bosses. But even if this were true, new workers would be more 
likely to be assigned to low quality bosses, but the quality of the workers assigned to those bosses would still be 
random. 
36
 We are unable to test whether observable characteristics of new workers are balanced across bosses because the 
data contain only worker identifiers, their start dates, and production histories. 
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To test this, in step one, boss effects are estimated on a subset of data for experienced 
workers who have had at least two previous bosses.  The BLUPS (best linear unbiased 
predictors) from step one are saved and used in step two, where daily output per hour of new 
workers is regressed on estimates of boss quality obtained from the experienced worker sample. 
The test is conducted for the models with θ=0 and with θ=.3 in the public model with θ=0 
from column 3 of Table 2, boss quality is measured using the bosses’ BLUP 0ˆ jd , estimated from 
the set of experienced workers.  The estimating equation for the test is then 
(16) itjiittBossi dXaoph 
  0,1,
ˆ ,
where itX contains year x month dummies, day of week dummies, and a fifth order tenure 
polynomial.  In the model with θ=0.3 from column 1 of Table 2, boss quality is measured as 
3.0
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yielding an estimating equation for the test 
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Assessing whether the boss quality measures predict well out of sample (i.e., beyond the 
experienced group on which they were estimated) implies a null hypothesis that 11  . 
Testing this hypothesis raises two difficulties.  First, each individual boss BLUP may 
contain measurement error.  This will bias estimates of 1  toward zero, resulting in over-rejection 
of the null that 11  . To correct for this, modified null hypothesis is created that accounts for 
measurement error; the correction is performed for the estimates where θ=0.  This correction is 
not performed in the case where θ=0.3 because the correction for measurement error depends on 
team size as well as the conditional variance of the boss random coefficients.  The variance of 
measurement error is assumed to be the mean of the conditional sampling variance of the 
individual boss BLUPs.  The result is 0.048.  The true variance of the BLUPS is just given by the 
estimated variance of the boss random effects for the experienced sample: 0.14.  If the true 
coefficient is 1, the estimated coefficient given the measurement error should be 
1/(1+0.048/0.14) = 0.745.  
Second, the standard errors from estimating the above models will be smaller than the 
true standard errors because there is no accounting for the fact that the boss quality measures are 
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generated regressors; this also results in over-rejection of the null. 
The results in Table 5, Columns 1 and 2, suggest that the estimated boss quality measures 
predict well out of sample. The parameter estimates are 0.8 and 0.72 for the models with θ=0 and 
θ=0.3, respectively, are statistically different from 1.37  However, the estimate is not significantly
different from the measurement-error-corrected coefficient. After accounting for the expected 
influence of measurement error, the data do not reject a coefficient of 1 in the regression of 
inexperienced worker productivity on the boss effects estimated from the experienced sample. 
It is reassuring that the boss quality measures estimated from the experienced sample of workers 
do a reasonable job of predicting the productivity of the new hires who are assigned randomly.  
On average, a good boss for experienced workers is a good boss for new, randomly assigned 
workers.  
Of course, it is possible that the initial assignment is not random, invalidating the 
maintained hypothesis and the test.  As a result, two additional tests of non-randomness are 
presented that do not rely on this maintained hypothesis.   
C.  Testing for Non-random Boss Transitions 
The remaining columns of Table 5 test for non-random sorting on unobservables.  
Consistent estimation of the individual boss quality measures requires orthogonality between the 
design matrix of boss assignments and the concurrent and lagged residuals in the productivity 
equation.  While a test cannot be carried out using concurrent residuals, it is possible to test 
whether residuals from the initial boss assignment predict the quality of future bosses.  Two tests 
are implemented.  The first is a test to determine whether the quality of future bosses predicts the 
mean residual calculated for each worker after estimating equation (16) or (16’).  The test is 
implemented by regressing the mean worker residuals on dummy variables for the quartiles of 
the distribution of the subsequent boss. That is, the mean residual for each worker from (16) or 
(16’) is regressed on dummies for quartiles of the quality distribution of a worker’s second boss.   
Under the null hypothesis of no sorting on unobservables, the dummy variables for 
quartiles of the distribution of future bosses should not predict the mean residuals from a 
worker’s first spell.38  A Wald test cannot reject that the quartile indicators for the second boss
37
 The observation counts in Columns 1 and 2 reflect the fact that only workers on their first boss spell are in the 
sample.   
38
 Using quartile indicators for boss quality is a stronger test than regressing the residuals on linear boss quality 
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assignment are zero in columns 3 and 4, providing additional reassurance that the boss quality 
measures are not contaminated by sorting on unobservables.
39
A second test assesses whether the mean residual by worker from the first boss spell, 
estimated from (16) or (16’), predicts second period boss quality.  These results are contained in 
the last two columns of Table 5.  The dependent variable is the boss BLUP (column 5) or boss 
random coefficient (column 6) on each worker’s second boss spell.  Some statistical evidence for 
predictability is detected, as the parameter estimates associated with the residuals from (16) and 
(16’) are statistically different from zero.  However, the parameter estimates are very small, 
suggesting that non-random the extent of non-random sorting is minimal compared to the 
variability in worker and boss ability. 
While these tests cannot speak to the allocation of bosses that occurs later in a worker’s 
career, when coupled with the external validation of the estimated boss effects on a separate 
sample of workers, the results suggest that non-random sorting is unlikely to be a problem for 
estimation.  
VIII. Boss Attrition
It seems reasonable to suppose that the boss selection process is such that the observed
bosses are the best candidates among the pool of potential bosses.  However, the firm’s forecast 
of future boss productivity is likely subject to error.  As the firm learns about boss productivity, 
the worst bosses are likely to be replaced.
40
To test this prediction, boss attrition is analyzed.  The approach is to estimate Cox 
proportional hazard models of the probability of boss exit.  The model includes indicators that 
the boss’s estimated fixed effect is below the 10th percentile of the distribution or above the 90th
percentile.  The prediction is that bad bosses leave and good bosses stay.
41
  Results are presented
using two versions of the estimated boss effects – those with the public/private boss effect 
because additional information about changes over the distribution can be captured. 
39
 Although this test may under-reject because of problems with measurement error regarding the quality of future 
bosses, using quartile indicators alleviates some of this concern.  Suppose that the measurement error is independent 
of the true boss effect.  Then if the concern is that the best bosses are assigned workers with the best residuals, it is 
very unlikely that measurement error is responsible for the failure to reject the null because the parameter estimates 
are non-monotonic.  This suggests that attenuation bias is not driving these results.   
40
 For theoretical models that would imply the layoff or voluntary separation of bad bosses, see Gibbons and Katz 
(1991), Gibbons and Waldman (1999a, b), Jovanovic (1979), and Lazear and Rosen (1981). 
41
 In this firm, bosses are not demoted. 
31 
estimated to be θ=.30 and those with the public boss effect in the regression in which θ=0.  
The results are in Table 6.  The exponentiated coefficients imply that bosses in the 
bottom 10% are more than twice as likely to exit the firm as bosses outside of the bottom 10%.  
This is true for both specifications in which θ=.30 and θ=0.42 To ensure that this result is not due
to noise (the concern being that the estimated boss quality measures for short-lived bosses are 
most likely to be in either tail of the distribution), the specifications include indicators for bosses 
above the 90
th
 percentile. These coefficients are small and are not statistically different from
zero. 
IX. Peer Effects
There is a growing literature on peer effects.
43
  If the best bosses are also likely to be
matched with the best team members, peer effects may confound the estimates.  To test for this, 
the basic specification with boss and worker fixed effects is run while adding a peer effect: 
(17)   ijtijtjiitijt paXq  
where the peer effect, pijt, is specified in two ways. 
One way to estimate peer effects is to use peers’ fixed effects as measures of the peer 
output, estimated using a two-step non-linear least squares routine.
44
  The estimating equation for
the joint model is 
(17’)   ijtkPeerjiitijt
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
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where summation over }{\ ijtk  captures the fixed effects of worker i’s team on day t with 
boss j while excluding worker i.  This specification allows the estimated peer effect to depend 
only on the permanent effect of co-workers on the team, αk, not on concurrent qijt.  Estimation of 
the joint model is not feasible on the full set of data because of memory constraints.
45
 Because
42
 Regressions are also run with boss tenure, where boss tenure is inferred from the time that we observe bosses, and 
thus is left-censored.  The hazard rate models are unchanged. 
43
 Most current peer effects papers test whether workers learn from each other due to proximity, or adjust their effort 
in response to those who work around them (Falk and Ichino, 2006) or who watch them (Mas and Moretti, 2009). 
Few papers test for the complementarity of skills within the teams that are formed among peers, because skills are 
unobserved and most data has come from production functions (like store clerks) that are largely individual output, 
not team output.  That is true of these data as well. 
44
 It is not possible to use a mixed effects model, as estimates of the individual worker fixed effects are necessary to 
ξ Peer. 
45
 Storage of the matrix of peer-indicators, even in sparse form, requires an order of magnitude more memory than 
storage of the data with only worker and boss indicators.   
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workers and bosses rarely move establishments, the joint procedure can be applied using subsets 
of establishments.  The estimation algorithm is a two-step procedure.  The outer-loop guesses a 
value of ξ Peer, the effect of increasing peers’ mean innate ability on productivity, and then 
computes the remaining parameters via a linear conjugate gradient procedure in an inner-loop 
conditioning on the value of ξ Peer.  Search is then over ξ Peer. 
The main result is that peer effects are not economically significant relative to boss and 
worker effects.  The regressions in column 1 of Table 7 use a subset of the data corresponding to 
a typical region, because joint estimation of worker effects and unconstrained peer effects is only 
feasible on subsets of the data.  The estimated peer effects are close to zero. 
Another method to estimate peer effects uses a peer’s first few months of output as a 
proxy for the peer’s current output.  These results are provided in column 2.  Again, the 
coefficient is close to zero. 
The conclusion is that peer effects are very small relative to boss effects.
46
  Note that this
production environment has relatively little teamwork because each worker primarily interacts 
with a customer, not with other workers.
47
  Although the workers can see each other and may
learn from each other or compete with each other, the workers do not appear to be complements 
in production. 
X. Conclusion 
Supervision and management are fundamental in personnel economics and in the theory 
of the firm.  Although we take as given that managers matter, neither the mechanisms through 
which they affect productivity nor the actual size of the effects have been documented 
previously.  By using a data set that reports daily output on workers and that records the 
supervisors to which they are assigned on each day, it is possible to examine the effects of bosses 
on worker productivity. 
Boss effects are large and significant.  Most important, bosses vary substantially in their 
quality.  A very good boss increases the output of the supervised team over that supervised by a 
46
 There is also possible sorting of workers into teams of correlated peers, because good workers will work together 
if given the choice of their preferred shift and there are similar preferred shifts for all workers.  If this sorting is 
temporal, based on recent performance (as it is), introducing worker fixed effects for peer effects will reduce the 
bias.  If the sorting is based on permanent performance, there will be an upward bias in the estimated peer effects. 
Given that the peer effects are zero or negative, this is not a concern. 
47
 The same is true in Mas and Moretti (2009), who also find significant, but small peer effects. 
33 
very bad boss by about as much as adding one member to the team. Using one normalization, the 
value of the average boss is about 1.75 times that of a worker. There is some documented 
persistence of boss effects, but much of the idiosyncratic aspect of what bosses do is fleeting. 
Additionally, the poorer quality bosses are less likely to remain with the firm and workers who 
are paired with the better bosses are more likely to remain with the firm. Finally, comparative 
advantage does not seem to be a major factor in this firm.  Sorting of the good bosses to good 
workers only slightly increases the firm’s total output. 
Of course, the results here pertain to only one firm.  The magnitudes of the boss effects 
are found to be large in this firm, but it is not possible to say whether boss effects of this size 
would be found in other firms.  In the course of conducting this research, we interviewed 
managers and workers at many firms.  All emphasized the significant effects that bosses have in 
coaching and motivating workers.  In this paper, we provide calculations that suggest that 
managerial productivity is roughly 75 percent greater than that of workers, which is in line with 
the pay premium that managers receive over workers.  The prevalence of higher managerial pay 
in the market is consistent with the findings from this one firm.
48
48
 See evidence in Cardiff, Lafontaine, and Shaw (2013) that managers (who are often first line supervisors) in the 
retail and manufacturing sectors earn from seven to twenty percent higher wages than workers. 
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Figure 1. Local Polynomial Smoothed Estimates of Boss Change Probabilities as a Function of 
Lagged Residual Productivity 
Note: The figure displays the results of a local polynomial regression of the probability of a boss change in month t 
on the mean productivity residual for worker i in month t-1.  This residual is taken from a regression of output-per-
hour on worker fixed effects, establishment fixed effects, year-by-month fixed effects, and a fifth order polynomial 
in tenure.  Confidence intervals are given in the shaded region.  The density plot shows the distribution of the lagged 
productivity residuals. 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Output Per Hour 5,729,508 10.26 3.16 0.1 40.0 
Uptime 4,870,610 0.96 0.03 0.5 1.0 
Output Per Hour* Uptime 4,870,610 10.01 3.00 0.4 40.0 
Quality 
Tenure 
221,954 
5,729,508 
2.16 
648.91 
0.78 
609.83 
0.5 
1.0 
5.0 
4,235.0 
Number of Workers 23,878 
Number of Unique Bosses Per Worker 23,878 3.99 2.78 1.0 19.0 
Daily Team Size 633,818 9.04 4.54 1.0 29.0 
Number of Bosses 1,940 
Number of Unique Workers Per Boss 1,940 49.15 35.41 1.0 250.0 
Mean Number of Other Bosses for Each Worker 1,940 4.69 1.51 0.0 11.3 
Note: The data contain daily worker productivity records from June 2006 to May 2010.  Output per hour is the daily 
average of the number of transactions per hour.  Uptime is the daily percent of time that the worker is available to 
handle transactions.  These measures are recorded by computer software.  There is some missing data on uptime.  
The missing uptime data is concentrated toward the beginning of the sample period.  The mean of output per hour 
when restricting the sample to the 4,870,610 worker-days with non-missing uptime is 10.38 with standard deviation 
3.08.  Quality is collected approximately weekly from a randomly administered survey on the service quality that a 
worker provides. 
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Table 2.  Variance Components Estimates of Boss, Worker, and Match Effects 
Notes:  For all mixed effects models, likelihood ratio tests reject a constrained model without boss effects.  All 
results weight the boss effects by the average team size of 9.04.  In specifications with non-zero θ, the weighting 
multiplies the standard deviation of boss random coefficients by 9.04^(1-θ).  All models contain a fifth order 
polynomial function of tenure and year x month dummies.  To be included in the sample for column 2, a worker 
either had to have less than 6 months of tenure or the boss 6 months previously must have been observed.  For 
workers with greater than 1 year of tenure, the boss 12 months previously must have been observed.  Notes for 
particular specifications follow.  Column (1): Mixed effects estimates of equation (13) in the text.   Θ is estimated in a 
two-step procedure with search in an outer loop over θ.  The inner loop uses the lme4 package in R to estimate the 
model.  For all mixed models, lme4 is used.  Column (2):  Mixed effects estimates of equation (12) in the text.   Θ is 
constrained to the estimate from column 1.   Match effects lagged 6 months and 12 months were also included in 
the specification.  The standard deviations of these match effects are 0.62 and 0.61, respectively.  The correlation 
between current and 6 month and 12 month lagged boss BLUPS is 0.10 and 0.16, respectively.  Column (3):  Mixed 
effects estimates of equation (14) in the text.   Θ is constrained to be 0.  Column(4): Fixed effects estimates of 
equation (14) in the text.   Θ is constrained to be 0.  The standard deviation of worker and boss fixed effects is 
calculated based on weighting by observations in the sample.  A conjugate gradient algorithm is used to recover the 
parameters.  Column (5): Mixed effects estimates of equation (14) in the text, replacing the dependent variable with 
a post-transaction survey of service quality on a 0-5 scale. 
Output-per-hour Quality Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
St. Dev. of Worker Effects 1.33 1.33 1.35 1.32 0.09
St. Dev. of Match Effects 0.758 0.59 0.752 0.06
St. Dev. of Boss Effects x Avg. Team Size^(1-θ) 4.74 4.08 4.104 3.44 0.78
θ 0.3 0.3 0 0 0
St. Dev. of 6 Month Lagged Boss Effects 
x Average Team Size^(1-θ)
St. Dev. of 12 Month Lagged Boss Effects
x Average Team Size^(1-θ)
Lambda 6:  St. Dev. of 6 month lagged boss effect /
St. Dev. of Current Boss Effect
Lambda 12:  St. Dev. of 12 month lagged boss effect / 
St. Dev. of Current Boss Effect
Correlation of Boss Blups from (5) and (3) 0.143
Mixed or Fixed Effects Mixed Mixed Mixed Fixed Mixed
Theta Estimated Yes Constrained Constrained Constrained Constrained
Number of Observations 5,729,508 4,747,015 5,729,508 5,729,508 221,954
Number of Workers 23,878 21,886 23,878 23,878 20,155
Number of Bosses 1,940 1,857 1,940 1,940 1,769
1.41
1.06
0.35
0.26
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Table 3.  Estimates of Worker Attrition from Cox Proportional Hazard Models 
Table 4.  Analysis of Match Effects by Boss and Worker Quality Cells 
Sample Workers with α below the mean Full Sample
θ=0.30 θ=0.30 θ=0 θ=0 θ=0.30 θ=0.30 θ=0 θ=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Boss Effect BLUP x -0.111 -0.099 -0.180 -0.164 -0.123 -0.117 -0.197 -0.189
Team Size ^ - θ 0.895 0.906 0.084 0.085 0.884 0.890 0.821 0.828
(0.020) (0.022) (0.041) (0.045) (0.014) (0.014) (0.029) (0.030)
Dummy for worker in bottom 0.187 0.192 0.134 0.139
10% of distribution of α 1.205 1.212 1.143 1.149
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Interaction of boss effect -0.043 -0.027 -0.032 -0.011
and bottom 10% worker 0.958 0.974 0.969 0.990
(0.033) (0.083) (0.030) (0.078)
Number of Observations 3,012,703 3,012,703 3,012,703 3,012,703 5,573,233 5,573,233 5,573,233 5,573,233
Notes:  Estimates of Cox proportional hazard models of worker attrition.  Each cell contains the coefficient, the exponentiated coefficient below and the standard 
error in parentheses. All specifiations contain establishment and year x month fixed effects.  The boss effects in columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 are the BLUPS from column 1 
of Table 2.  The boss effects in the remaining columns are from column 3 of Table 2.  Sample sizes differ from prior tables because the last month of data is 
excluded. This restriction is necessary to characterize exits separately from the end of the sample.  Results are qualitatively similar after dropping left censored 
workers.
Panel A:  Match Effects from Column 1, Table 2 (θ=0.3)
Boss
Good Bad
Star 0.100 -0.083
Laggard 0.05 -0.063
Panel B  Match Effects from Column 3, Table 2 (θ=0)
Boss
Good Bad
Star 0.104 -0.077
Laggard 0.04 -0.066
Notes: Good bosses and star workers are those above the median of the distribution of boss and worker effects, respectively.  The
cells contain the means of the estimated match effects.
Worker
Worker
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Table 5.  Out of Sample Validation of Boss Effects and Tests for Non-Random Assignment 
Out of Sample Validation
Sorting Test 1:  Do quantiles of 
future boss quality predict 
residuals?
Sorting Test 2:  Do lagged residuals 
predict future boss quality?
Dependent Variable: Oph Oph
Mean residual by 
worker from 
Column (1)
Mean residual by 
worker from 
Column (2)
Boss effect from 
experienced sample 
(θ= 0)
Boss effect from 
experienced sample 
(θ = 0.3)
Sample:
New workers' on their 1st boss 
assignment
New workers' on 1st boss 
assignment New workers' on 2nd boss assignment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Boss BLUP estimated from experienced 0.8008
sample (θ = 0) (0.0814)
Boss random coeff. estimated from experienced 0.7163
sample x Team Size ^ -0.3 (θ = 0.3) (0.0669)
Dummy for boss in the bottom 25% of Blups -0.1039 -0.0560
(column 3) or random coefficients (column 4) (0.0620) (0.0698)
Dummy for boss in 25%-50% -0.0382 -0.0895
(0.0582) (0.0667)
Dummy for boss in 50%-75% -0.1115 -0.0404
(0.0618) (0.0618)
Mean residual by worker from Column (1) 0.0036
(0.0016)
Mean residual by worker from Column (2) 0.0109
(0.0038)
Wald statistic that quartile differences are zero 4.9012 2.0311
P-Value 0.1792 0.5660
R-squared 0.1058 0.1076 0.0366 0.0299 0.2404 0.4010
Number of Observations 782,778 782,778 10,935 10,935 10,935 10,935
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by boss.  Wald tests are also calculated using a variance-covariance matrix clustered by boss.  The sample in columns 1-4 contains 
workers on their first assignment prior to the first boss switch.  The sample in columns 5 and 6 track the workers from columns 1-4 after their first boss change.  To be included, workers 
must have had at least 20  days of tenure on the first boss spell; this removes data from a training period.  Boss BLUPS or random coefficients are calculated using a partitioned set of 
workers as follows:  First, using a sample including only workers after their second boss switch, boss effects for this sample are computed by regressing oph on a tenure polynomial, 
month, and day of week fixed effects, along with boss, worker, and match random effects (or random coefficients in the case of Theta = 0.3).  The individual boss BLUPs (or random 
coefficients) are then recovered via the method in the text.  Second, the boss quality measures from the experienced sample are merged with the sample of workers on their first boss.
The models in columns 1 and 2 have controls for tenure and monthly time dummies.    The models in columns 3-6 add establishment fixed effects.
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Table 6.  Estimates of Boss Attrition from Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
θ=0.30 θ=0
(1) (2)
Dummy for Boss Effect Below 10th Percentile 1.000 0.591
2.720 1.805
(0.090) (0.090)
Dummy for Boss Effect Above 90th Percentile 0.040 0.083
1.040 1.086
(0.100) (0.100)
N 620,130 620,130
Notes:  Each cell contains the coefficient, the exponentiated coefficient below and the standard error in parentheses.  The
boss effects in column 1 are from estimation of equation 13 in column 1 of Table 2.  The boss effects in column 2 are from 
the estimation of equation 14 in column 5 of Table 2.  Sample sizes differ from Table 1 because the last month of data is
excluded to be able to characterize boss exits.  Results are qualitatively similar after dropping left censored bosses and in
specifications with and without left censored bosses.
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Table 7.  The Effect of Peer Quality on Output-per-Hour 
Estimation method: Joint Peer Proxies 
R-squared 0.2356 0.243 
Coefficient on Peers’ Mean Ability 0.001 -0.022 
Standard Deviation of Peer Effects 0.0004 0.009 
Standard Deviation of Boss Effects (Weighted by worker-days) 2.85 3.44 
Standard Deviation of Worker Effects (Weighted by worker-days) 1.65 1.32 
Number of Workers 1,679 23,878 
Number of Bosses 155 1,940 
Number of Observations 391,730 5,729,508 
Note: All specifications contain a fifth order polynomial function of tenure (with a 365 day cutoff and cutoff 
indicator), monthly time dummies, day of week dummies, and boss and worker fixed effects.  In column 1, the joint 
estimation procedure uses non-linear least squares, taking the mean of the team members’ individual fixed effects as 
a measure of peer quality.  The joint estimation procedure is computationally demanding; an “outer” loop is used to 
search over the peer effect coefficient, while an inner loop conditions on the outer loop value and solves for the 
parameters using a conjugant gradient procedure.  The joint procedure is not possible on the full data because of 
memory issues in Matlab; storage of the matrix of peer fixed effects requires an order of magnitude more memory 
than using a single-dimensional index of peer quality.  In column 2, the peer proxies use mean output on the first 
three months on the job as the value of peer quality.  If a worker’s first three months are not observed, then the mean 
value of all observed workers’ first three months is used.  To calculate the standard deviation of peer effects, it is 
assumed that one peer’s output increases by a standard deviation change in output per hour, or 3.16 units.  This is 
then multiplied by the Coefficient on Peer’s Mean Ability and divided by (9.04-1), the mean number of other team 
members.   
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